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A B S T R A C T
Past research has shown that media coverage during election campaigns influences citizen preferences and
expectations about parties and political candidates. Very little is known, however, about the effect of media
coverage on post-electoral coalition preferences and expectations. This is surprising, given that speculations
about post-electoral coalition building are an essential part of election campaigns in all multiparty systems. This
paper investigates the consequences that coalitions' media saliency and tone have on voter preferences and
expectations about these potential coalitions. Using media and panel data from the 2013 German and Austrian
election campaigns, we find that media coverage has substantial effects on voter perceptions although the effects
differ in strength between the two countries. These findings have important implications for our understanding
of media effects, voter expectations and campaign strategies.
1. Introduction
Coalition governments are closely connected to elections under
multiparty systems and represent one of the most important topics
discussed during election campaigns in these systems (e.g., Hobolt and
Karp, 2010). Recent studies have shown that coalition preferences and
expectations influence voting behaviour and, as such, can have im-
portant consequences for election outcomes (e.g., Bargsted and Kedar,
2009; Blais et al., 2006; Bowler et al., 2010).
Motivated by these findings, research has started investigating how
citizens form preferences on post-election coalition governments
(Debus and Müller, 2014; Falcó-Gimeno, 2012). Two recently published
studies (Nyhuis and Plescia, 2017; Plescia and Aichholzer, 2017) found
that citizens' evaluations of coalitions enjoy a certain degree of in-
dependence from other objects of vote choice, including their con-
stituent parties. A few attempts have also been made to explain post-
electoral coalition expectations: in this regard, existing studies focused
on the effect of party preferences and published opinion polls on voter
expectations (e.g., Faas et al., 2008; Meffert and Gschwend, 2011). To
date however, the existing literature has largely overlooked the possible
effect that media coverage can have on attitudes towards coalition
governments. This lack of research is surprising, as most voters receive
their impression of coalitions primarily from mass media (Schmitt-Beck
and Farrell, 2002), and electoral preferences and expectations are likely
to be contingent upon media coverage (Van der Meer, Hakhverdian &
Aaldering, 2016). In fact, media coverage in the run-up to the election
affects voters' preferences and expectations of the election outcome and
may even impact their vote choice (Faas et al., 2008). Existing research
has found conspicuous effects of saliency and tone cues in media cov-
erage on preferences and support for parties (e.g., Brettschneider, 2005;
Van der Meer, Hakhverdian & Aaldering, 2016; Geiβ and Schäfer,
2017), but very little is known about the consequences of such cues on
voter preferences for, or expectations about post-election coalition
outcomes (Strömbäck, 2012; Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002).
Against this background, this study represents the first attempt to
examine the effect of media coverage on preferences as well as ex-
pectations over post-electoral coalition governments. The current study
contributes to the existing literature in several important ways. First,
we focus on a political object, i.e., coalition governments that have only
received scant attention in the existing literature on public opinion and
media effects. This is surprising since discussions about future coalition
governments are an integral part of any campaign in multiparty systems
(Meffert and Gschwend, 2011), and because media influence on coali-
tion preferences and expectations can potentially be pervasive given
that coalitions are a much more abstract construct compared to parties,
which “are a real, physical entity, represented by candidates, organi-
zations, messages and salient symbols” (Meffert and Gschwend, 2012,
p.4).
Second, while most prior studies have considered only the effect of
pre-election opinion polls on electoral expectations (Faas et al., 2008;
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Meffert et al., 2011), we go beyond a focus on opinion polls and con-
sider all cues in media coverage that are directly related to prospective
coalitions. This is important because, although polls are an integral part
of election coverage, they are not the only cues voters receive during
election campaigns (Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002).
Third, we focus on two main traits of the journalistic product,
namely saliency and tone simultaneously as done by a few existing
studies on party preferences (Hopmann et al., 2010), vote choice (Geiβ
and Schäfer, 2017; Geers and Bos, 2016) and candidate preferences
(Eberl, Wagner & Boomgaarden, 2017b).
Last but not least, this study combines panel data with a compara-
tive approach, which allows us to reduce, albeit not eliminate, the se-
lection bias and causality issue, thereby strengthening our causal claim
on how media coverage affects coalition expectations. Specifically, we
rely on data from the German and Austrian parliamentary election
campaigns of 2013, combining online panel surveys with media cov-
erage of the most important newspapers in both countries. As such, this
paper provides the first comparative study of the effect of media cov-
erage on citizen expectations, tying the literature on media effects
closely together with that on voter expectations, which have largely
remained isolated from one another.
We find that even after controlling for structural differences across
outlets and coalitions as well as individual-level differences, media
coverage has substantial effects on voters' coalition preferences and
expectations. The saliency and tone of media coverage have a some-
what stronger effect on coalition expectations compared to coalition
preferences, in which case individual-level party predispositions appear
to play a larger role. We also find important differences across the two
countries when it comes to both media coverage and its effects.
Recognizing the importance of media coverage for voters' coalition
preferences and expectations has consequences on our understanding of
party strategy and political competition. To increase their perceived
likelihood and, by that, eventually, their actual likelihood of being part
of a governing coalition, parties can emphasize certain coalition options
during the election campaign by sending clear signals to voters. Such
strategies may reduce voters' hardship in deciding upon coalition ma-
jorities before the elections and lessen media influence in shaping ex-
pectations about post-electoral coalitions.
2. Sources of voter electoral preferences and expectations
The existing research on the determinants of coalition preferences
and expectations has usually focused on the two separately.
Starting with preferences for post-electoral coalition governments,
the literature has mainly examined the extent to which partisan at-
tachment, ideological proximity and leader preferences influence coa-
lition preferences. On the first aspect, it has been found that coalition
preference follows, first of all, from party preference and long-term
party identification (Plescia and Aichholzer, 2017). Moving to ideolo-
gical proximity, in the Downsian framework, voters, parties, and can-
didates are assumed to hold positions in the ideological space and the
utility of voters is determined by the distance between the voter and the
political object, that being the party or the candidate (Downs, 1957).
The few studies that have looked at sources of coalition preferences,
find that the ideological distance between the voter and the overall
position of the potential coalition also matters to explain coalition
preferences (Falcó-Gimeno, 2012; Debus and Müller, 2014). In addi-
tion, attitudes towards the leader of the larger coalition partner (and
future prime minister) have been found to bear disproportional influ-
ence on coalition preferences when compared to the preferences for the
leader of the junior coalition partner. This may have to do with leaders
of the main parties enjoying more visibility during the elections (Bowler
et al., 2014).
When it comes to the sources of voters' expectations over post-
electoral coalitions, the existing literature has made a broad distinction
between individual-level and contextual-level sources. The first sources
are, as the term suggests, subject-specific and unlikely to change much
over the course of an election. By far the most well-known and most
studied form of subjective influence is long-term partisan affiliation. A
partisan preference implies a strong directional motivation that favours
preferred outcomes over disliked ones (Price, 2000). The so-called
“wishful thinking” refers to the process by which citizens overestimate
the likelihood of outcomes they prefer (e.g., Meffert et al., 2011, p.805).
In other words, coalition expectations follow first of all from party
preferences.
The second type of source is context-specific and should be similar
across subjects within a specific context, given that it is based on
shared, factual information available to all voters in that context. The
most common piece of information on parties, candidates, and coalition
post-electoral expectations available to voters during an election cam-
paign are opinion polls (Brettschneider, 2005). Polls have become a
prevalent feature of media coverage during national campaigns, pro-
viding voters with vast opportunities to learn rather sophisticated in-
formation about upcoming elections (Meffert et al., 2011). The evi-
dence suggests that polls and media coverage of polls influence
coalition preferences and may lead to vote-switching (Geers et al.,
2018). They do so in particular, since the higher a coalition's standing is
in the polls, the more likely that coalition is perceived by the voters,
thus inducing strategic voting (e.g., Faas et al., 2008).
While some studies in this field focus on polls as mere reporting of
numeral facts (Faas et al., 2008; Meffert et al., 2011), others ac-
knowledge that polls are reported in the context of news stories, that
they may include mediated coalition signals and that they are thus
subject to media framing as well (e.g., Meffert and Gschwend, 2011;
Van der Meer, Hakhverdian & Aaldering, 2016). Nevertheless, Meffert
and Gschwend (2011) do find a distinct effect of the mere numerical
facts presented in polls that goes beyond additional signals presented in
the corresponding journalistic interpretation and presentation of the
polls.
3. Media coverage as a source for coalition preferences and
expectations: hypotheses
Electoral preferences and expectations are likely to be contingent
upon media cues since most voters receive their impression of politics
and political actors primarily from mass media (e.g., Schmitt-Beck and
Farrell, 2002; Van der Meer, Hakhverdian & Aaldering, 2016). When
analysing the effect of media on voter attitudes toward political objects
(e.g., candidates, parties or coalitions), two main media cues are of
major importance: the saliency of, and the tone toward a specific poli-
tical object (Eberl, Boomgaarden & Wagner, 2017a; Geiβ and Schäfer,
2017).
Saliency refers to the visibility of political actors in news reporting.
Political actors can be more or less salient in the media as they compete
for media attention. Such visibility can help voters to gather important
information on parties and candidates and may influence subsequent
political judgments (Kiousis and McCombs, 2004), especially because
voters tend to infer a party's political importance and quality from its
media saliency (Miller and Krosnick, 2000). Tone toward a specific
political object adds a qualitative aspect to media coverage by con-
sidering how that political object is covered in the media. The tone of
media coverage “is important because it can provide the audience with
templates for understanding politics” (Eberl, Boomgaarden & Wagner,
2017a, p.1128). Existing works on valence framing indicate that tone
towards an object affects the evaluation of these aspects in public's
mind (de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2003).
Although not yet assessed in the existing literature, we expect media
cuing to also be relevant for citizen evaluations and expectations of
post-electoral coalitions. It is even possible that media effects are larger
for coalitions than for parties and candidates. In fact, while parties, are
real entities, represented by candidates, leaders, organizations, etce-
tera, coalitions are purely hypothetical with no current physical or
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symbolic representation (Meffert and Gschwend, 2012). Voters may
thus rely even more strongly on mass media coverage when they form
their opinion about coalitions.
Starting with saliency, it has been shown that mere saliency of
parties and candidates in the media has extensive effects on preferences
for parties and vote choice (Oegema and Kleinnijenhuis, 2000). In
particular, the exposure effect alone suggests a positive effect of fre-
quency of contact with an object on the familiarity (Van Aelst,
Maddens, Noppe & Fiers, 2008) and evaluation of this object itself
(Zajonc, 2001). Likewise, the saliency of political actors in specific
outlets is likely to skew audiences' judgments favourably toward these
political actors and their electoral viability (Miller and Krosnick, 2000;
Oegema and Kleinnijenhuis, 2000). As such, visibility is likely to have
an effect on both post-electoral coalition preferences and expectations.
Specifically, we hypothesize that: The more visible a coalition is in
voters' media repertoire, the higher the voter preferences and ex-
pectations that this coalition will form after the election (Hypothesis 1).
Moving to tone, the tone of media coverage is important because
audiences' inferences about candidate traits are rather automatically
made from positive or negative descriptions in texts (see Druckman and
Parkin, 2005). Existing studies show that positively valenced news fa-
vourably influences the evaluation of parties and candidates (e.g.,
Balmas and Sheafer, 2010; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2007). Nyhuis and
Plescia (2017) find that the share of positive mentions of the coalition
options among all evaluative mentions in the media during the election
campaign has a positive effect on voters perceiving that coalition as
more competent. This finding suggests that tone in the media tends to
influence prospective coalition arrangements (see also de Nooy and
Kleinnijenhuis, 2016). Hence, we hypothesize that: The more favour-
able the tone toward a coalition is in voters' media repertoire, the
higher the voter preferences and expectations that this coalition will
form after the election (Hypothesis 2).
4. The two case studies: Germany and Austria
Comparative analyses are extremely important to assess the gen-
eralizability of media effects, but unfortunately still largely absent in
the existing literature. While European elections are often used to study
comparative media effects (e.g., Van Spanje and de Vreese, 2014), there
is hardly any comparative research relating to national elections in
different countries (Boomgaarden and Schmitt-Beck, 2016). Our study
of Austria and Germany during the 2013 elections is an important
contribution in this regard and a relevant addition to those few studies
that have analysed media effects in multiparty systems (e.g., Hopmann
et al., 2010; Eberl et al., 2017a, 2017b; Takens et al., 2015).
4.1. The media environments
In both countries, media outlets generally refrain from taking clear
partisan stances and communicating them publicly, such as in open
political endorsements. Most media outlets explicitly state that they
adhere to the standards of impartiality and diversity of opinions. Yet,
differences exist.
Starting with Germany, the country has a prototypical democratic
corporatist media system with strong public broadcasters and a historic
alignment between parties and newspapers. Overall political paralle-
lism in the press, i.a., the degree to which media content reflects dis-
tinct political orientations (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p. 28), is above
the European average but lower than in other European countries like
Austria or France. Political parallelism in television news, however, is
quite low and comparable to that typical for liberal media systems, such
as in the Scandinavian countries (Lelkes, 2016). The Austrian media
system is similar in many ways to that of Germany, but has a particu-
larly high press circulation, a high level of readiness for political in-
tervention and closeness between parties and media (Hallin and
Mancini, 2004). Although journalists exhibit ideal-typical journalistic
values concerning objectivity in reporting, political parallelism in the
Austrian newspaper sector has been classified as slightly above the
European average (Lelkes, 2016).
4.2. The election contexts
In Germany, during the entire campaign leading to the 2013 elec-
tions, it was clear that the incumbent Chancellor Angela Merkel, leader
of the Christian democrats (CDU), would again win the elections. Still,
in terms of government coalitions, there was uncertainty over the
outcome of the election. On the one hand, it was unsure whether the
Liberals (FDP) would make it into the Parliament crossing the 5%
electoral threshold. Consequently, the continuation of the then in-
cumbent government between the CDU, her Bavarian sister the CSU and
the FDP, was rather uncertain (Faas, 2015). The Social Democrats (SPD)
were willing to form a government with the Greens. However, it was
fairly unlikely that the two parties would obtain a majority of the votes
on their own. The Left Party was certain to enter the parliament given
their strong support in Eastern German states. Both the Pirate Party and
the Alternative for Germany were unsure to gain representation, but all
main parties declared their unavailability to enter in governments with
them (Faas, 2015). Eventually, a (grand) coalition of Christian and
Social Democrats formed after the elections.
The results of the 2013 Austrian national election were also far from
certain beforehand (Dolezal and Zeglovits, 2014) and the parties con-
tributed to this uncertainty by sending voters very few coalition signals.
This is a common strategy of political parties in Austria. The center-left
Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), and likely election winner, refrained
from committing to any specific post-election coalition. The center-
right People's Party (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) also
refrained from making explicit coalition statements, not wanting to rule
out any possible coalitions after the elections. The Greens saw both the
SPÖ and the ÖVP as possible coalition partners, clearly ruling out a
coalition with the far-right party, the FPÖ. Attitudes toward two new
parties, the NEOS (a liberal party) and the Team Stronach (led by a
business tycoon), remained mostly ambiguous since it was not clear
whether they would pass the 4% electoral threshold (Eberl et al., 2014).
Eventually, again a (grand) coalition SPÖ-ÖVP formed after the elec-
tions.
5. Data and methods
To test our hypotheses, we will proceed with a secondary analysis of
survey and media data provided by the interdisciplinary frameworks of
the German Longitudinal Study (GLES) and the Austrian National
Election Study (AUTNES). Survey data come from online access panels,
which were largely in line with the overall population, with minor
discrepancies concerning age and education in Germany (Rattinger
et al., 2016), and age and region in Austria (Kritzinger et al., 2016).
Media content in both countries was analysed using manual content
analysis. The unit of analysis is the single article in Germany and the
single political claim in the title, lead, and first paragraph of each ar-
ticle in Austria (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). For the following
analysis only articles and TV reports in Germany and claims in Austria
mentioning one of the coalitions were included, generating a subsample
of 981 articles and TV reports in Germany and a subsample of 862
claims (in 203 articles) in Austria. The media data cover the 9 weeks
prior to Election Day in Germany and the 6 weeks prior to Election Day
in Austria.
For Germany, the media sample includes the six most important
superregional quality newspapers (Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt and Die Tageszeitung and
the most widely read tabloid, the Bildzeitung; Rattinger et al., 2015a) as
well as the four most important television news programs (ARD Ta-
gesschau, ZDF heute, RTL Aktuell, Sat.1 Nachrichten; Rattinger et al.,
2015b). By including both print and television outlets in the German
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case we cover 89% of our respondents; in other words only 11% of the
respondents to our public opinion survey use none of the ten media
outlets mentioned above. The media analysis covers three coalitions:
the center-right, incumbent coalition of the Christian Democratic Union
and the Liberals (CDU/CSU-FDP), the center-left coalition of the Social
Democrats and the Greens (SPD-GR) and the grand coalition (CDU/
CSU-SPD).1
For Austria, the media sample was selected on the basis of circula-
tion figures, genre, as well as national and regional distribution and
includes the quality newspapers Der Standard, Die Presse and the
Salzburger Nachrichten, the tabloids Kronen Zeitung, Österreich and Heute
as well as the midrange newspapers Kurier and Kleine Zeitung (Eberl
et al., 2016). Due to data scarcity, in the Austrian case, we cannot cover
exposure to TV news as we do for Germany. While this is a limitation of
our study, due to the fact that TV represents an important source of
political information in Austria, only a very small percentage of re-
spondents in our survey (around 9%) do not read any of the analysed
newspapers (Kritzinger et al., 2016). The media analysis includes cov-
erage of the incumbent coalition SPÖ-ÖVP, the ÖVP-FPÖ, the SPÖ-FPÖ,
the SPÖ-GR as well as the ÖVP-GR. Furthermore, two three-party
coalitions were included; one between the SPÖ-ÖVP and the Greens
(SPÖ-ÖVP-GR) and one between the People's Party, the Freedom Party
and the Team Stronach (ÖVP-FPÖ-TS). Hence, the sample of covered
coalitions in the Austrian data is more extensive than that in Germany,
which only covers the three most likely and visible coalitions (see also
below).
In Germany, content data was linked to the general population using
wave 1 and wave 2 (both conducted prior to the start of the election
campaign) and wave 6 (a few days before Election Day); similarly, for
Austria, the content data was linked to the general population using
wave 1 (conducted prior to the start of the election campaign) and wave
3 (a few days before Election Day). To sum up, media data covers large
parts of the election campaigns.
5.1. Measurement of dependent and independent variables
The dependent variables are measured similarly in the two coun-
tries. For coalition preferences, respondents were asked about their
preferences for each of the coalitions for which media content data
were gathered, ranging from “certainly not preferable” to “very pre-
ferable” using an 11-point scale in both countries. For coalition ex-
pectations, respondents were asked about the perceived likelihood that
a given coalition would form after the election, ranging from “certainly
not” to “very certain”, using an 11-point scale in Germany and a 4-point
scale in Austria.
Our key independent variables are media saliency and tone. Starting
with saliency, a coalition is coded as present in a news article or tele-
vision segment if it was among the first three actors mentioned (for the
GLES data) or if it was a topic addressed in at least one of the analysed
claims (for the AUTNES data). Hence, the media saliency for each
coalition is based on the relative number of articles in which the coa-
lition is present. However, we cannot simply use this relative number in
our analysis. Some media outlets might generally leave less space for
coverage about coalitions due simply to genre or format influences
(Eberl et al., 2017a, 2017b). To be able to take into account differences
between coalitions while considering media outlet specificities, we
follow Druckman and Parkin (2005) and use the average saliency of all
coalitions in each media outlet during the period of analysis as a
benchmark. This measure captures whether a coalition's saliency is
higher or lower in comparison to what is typical for that outlet.
Therefore, our measure of saliency captures a deviation from the
average saliency that coalitions get in a specific outlet.
We measure media tone toward a coalition as an average based on
expressions of support and criticism, as well as neutral statements at
the article/segment level (on a five-point scale from −1, −0.5, 0,
+0.5 and + 1 for the GLES data) or claim level (on a three-point
scale from −1, 0 and + 1 for the AUTNES data). Tone is coded based
on journalists' explicit statements on their coalition preferences, as
well as citations or paraphrases of parties' coalition preferences.
While statements about the likelihood of a coalition to form after the
election would be coded as positive tone, a simple report of polling
results would not suffice. Colloquial labels such as the
“Ampelkoalition” (CDU/CSU-FDP-GR) or “Tigerenten Koalition”
(CDU/CSU-FDP) were linked to the respective coalition but not
coded as inherently evaluative. As with saliency, tone is then com-
puted as the deviation of each coalition's specific tone from the
average tone toward all other coalitions in that outlet. To ensure
comparability between saliency and tone, both have been standar-
dized to range from −1 to 1, where a coalition has a value of 0 when
its saliency or tone is equal to the mean saliency or tone across all
other coalitions in that media outlet.2
This data is then linked to voter data using voters' reported media
consumption for each outlet during the election campaign (on a scale
from 0 to 7 days a week and measured in the pre-election waves in both
countries). We computed voter i's content exposure (in saliency or tone)












. As we do not expect content effects on
voters who declared not having been exposed to any of the media
outlets under study, we assigned these respondents a content exposure
value of 0 (balance), to keep them in the analysis and account for a
theoretically correct model specification.3
We add several control variables to our models. First, we should not
expect all coalitions to be treated equally by the media. Some are in-
deed expected to be featured more in the news simply due to their news
value. The most frequently studied campaign valence indicator is in-
cumbency status (Carey et al., 2000) which grants an electoral premium
independent of policy traits. To exclude such structural differences
across coalitions (see also Eberl, Boomgaarden and Wagner, 2017a), we
include in our models a dummy variable for incumbency status, which
represents a shorthand indicator for a number of factors like news value
and familiarity. Second, we control for variables, which the existing
literature has shown are important to explain our two dependent
variables. In this regard, we control for party preferences using the only
available measure in both sets of data, that is, party identification and
preference for the future chancellor. In the first case, we build a vari-
able that for each coalition and each respondent takes a value of 1 when
the coalition included the party for which the respondent has a party
identification or 0 otherwise. For chancellor preference, we include a
dummy variable for whether (=1) or not (=0) the coalition includes
the most preferred future chancellor. Both variables are expected to
have a positive effect on preferences and expectations (see Plescia and
Aichholzer, 2017).4 We also control for the standings of the coalitions
1 In 2013, among others, a possible coalition between the SPD, the Linke and
the Greens was also discussed in the media. This coalition, however, was not
asked about in the GLES survey and thus cannot be included in our analyses.
2 Intercoder reliability scores (Krippendorff's α) for the German data, are
based on a subset of articles (n= 145) coded by eight coders. The scores for the
identification of and evaluative statements toward the CDU/CSU-FDP, CDU/
CSU-SPD and SPD-GR coalitions were 0.83, 0.85 and 0.91, respectively.
Reliability scores for the Austrian data are based on a subset of claims
(n= 1123) coded by seven coders. The scores for the identification of evalua-
tive statements and topics were at 0.67 and 0.72, respectively.
3 It should be noted that excluding these cases or assigning them with an
average saliency or an average tone (for each party and based on all re-
spondents) did not substantially change the results. See the Appendix.
4 A measure of party preferences is not available in the Austrian survey. Yet, a
test for the German data using party preferences instead of party identification
leads to the same conclusions.
J.-M. Eberl, C. Plescia Electoral Studies 55 (2018) 30–39
33
in the opinion polls in interaction with attentiveness to the electoral
campaign (see Faas et al., 2008).5 Together with political preferences
discussed above, the actual standing of the coalition should provide us
with a good approximation for baseline citizen perceptions, against
which we can assess the effects of media saliency and tone throughout
the campaign. Beside this, we add standard controls such as gender
(dummy for female) and age (in years). Political sophistication is rather
difficult to operationalize and since we lack a measure of factual
knowledge in the Austrian survey, we add to the models both re-
spondent's education (to represent the cognitive skills components) and
their political interest (to capture the political motivation component;
see Lachat, 2007).
Fig. 1 provides detailed information on the timing of measurement of
the different variables as well as on the different data sources. Importantly,
as shown in Fig. 1, we address the issue of causality by measuring the
dependent variables in wave 6 in Germany and wave 3 in Austria that is,
at the end of the election campaign. Furthermore, all survey-based control
variables are measured at the beginning of the election campaign and just
before the corresponding media data, except for coalition standing in the
polls and attentiveness to the campaign, which are averaged over several
waves and thus the entire election campaign. Given that standing in the
polls and attentiveness to the campaign remain pretty stable during the
entire election campaign, substituting averages with standing in the polls
or attentiveness to the campaign at the end or at the beginning of the
campaign lead to almost identical results. The media data covers all po-
litical coverage between the survey waves 2 and 6 in Germany as well as
between wave 1 and 3 in Austria.
5.2. Models
The test of both sets of hypotheses relies on linear regression
models.6 Since we expect saliency and tone to have effects on all po-
tential coalitions and not only on particular ones, for both sets of
models, coalition perceptions are combined (“stacked”) and estimated
in a single model for each country.7 In this dataset, each respondent
contributes as many observations as the number of analysed coalitions
that is, three in Germany and seven in Austria (note that due to missing
values, not all respondents contribute the exact same number of judg-
ments). As such, these judgments are not statistically independent from
each other. In order to correct our estimates for possible errors in-
troduced by the duplication of observations in the stacked data set, we
employ linear regressions with clustered standard errors (respondents
being the clusters).8
6. Empirical findings
Descriptive evidence shows that media outlets differ in their cov-
erage of coalitions in the two countries in important ways. Starting with
saliency and Fig. 2, in the German media, the bonus for the incumbent
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition is very large, although a little less so for
broadcasts and tabloids. In the Austrian media coverage, the incumbent
(SPÖ-ÖVP) coalition and the main challenger (ÖVP-FPÖ) coalition got
the highest media attention in most media outlets. Still, there were
differences between outlets in respect to how strongly these coalitions
were being overrepresented in comparison to other coalitions. The
striking difference between the German and Austrian coverage is that in
the former, differences between outlets are much less pronounced.
Moving to tone, Fig. 3 displays conspicuous variation between
Fig. 1. Merging voter and media data.
5 Note that our opinion data do not ask respondents how attentive they were
to polls but only to the general election campaign.
6 Ordered logit yield to the same results.
7 The reshaping changes the unit of analysis from respondents to re-
spondent× coalition. Some independent variables such as party identification,
are already defined as respondent× coalition specific relationships. Other
variables like age are respondent specific. For this reason, some scholars suggest
to re-conceptualise these variables as proximity measure. This procedure,
however, creates coefficients that only express the importance of that variable
in general and hence are not directly interpretable. This is the reason why we
avoid this approach in the paper. However, the Appendix shows that our results
are robust to this alternative specification.
8 To test the robustness of our findings we also re-run our main models with
standard errors clustered by respondents as well as coalitions (see Table A3). In
addition, we re-run our models using a hierarchical analysis considering two
levels of interest: individual*coalitions and individuals (see Table A4). The
results in the Appendix support the paper's conclusions.
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outlets in both countries. In Germany, the conservative newspapers
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Welt covered the CDU/CSU-FDP as
well as the CDU/CSU-SPD more positively. Die Welt – Germany's most
conservative quality newspaper – preferred a grand coalition between
CDU/CSU and SPD to the incumbent center-right coalition between
Christian Democrats and Liberals. Die Tageszeitung, arguably the most
left-wing newspaper, shows clear preferential coverage for the SPD-GR
coalition. For television news, we did not have any clear expectations
concerning the political slant of the coverage. Austrian newspaper
outlets appear to all have covered the ÖVP-GR coalition relatively more
positively, similarly most outlets disliked the idea of an SPÖ-FPÖ coa-
lition. Generally, results meet face validity, with Der Standard, for ex-
ample, a liberal newspaper, portraying the two coalitions that include
the Greens much more positively as compared to all the other coali-
tions.
Fig. 4 shows the average figures for the dependent variables (i.e.,
preferences and likelihood) for all coalitions included in our study.
Among the respondents in our online survey, there are clear differences
between coalitions, as well as between preferences and expectations for
each coalition. In Austria, for example, the most preferred coalition is
the grand-coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP, the one that is also
the most likely according to the respondents. In Germany, the
incumbent coalition between the CDU and the FDP is the least liked one
while the other two coalitions are almost equally liked. Finally, in both
countries, the eventual post-electoral governments (CDU-SPD, for
Germany and SPÖ-ÖVP, for Austria) were perceived as most likely and
these options were also among the most liked ones. We turn now to
multivariate models to examine the extent to which differences in sal-
iency and tone influenced voter preferences and expectations. Note that
in the regression models below, we rescale coalition preferences and
expectations for both countries to range from 0 to 1 to ease the inter-
pretation of the results.
6.1. Does media coverage influence coalition preferences and expectations?
Table 1 presents the results for all regression models. Results show
that in both countries, media coverage influences coalition preferences
and expectations; although the effect differs between countries, as well
as between our two dependent variables. Starting with preferences,
Table 1 shows that saliency has a positive effect in Germany and ne-
gative in Austria but in both cases the coefficients do not reach con-
ventional level of statistical significance. When it comes to tone, the
more favourable the tone toward a coalition is in voters' media re-
pertoire, the higher voter preference for that specific coalition. The
effects are (much) weaker in Germany, where the effect of coalition
saliency is positive but not significant. Moving to voters' expectations of
which coalitions will form after the election (Hypothesis 1 and Hy-
pothesis 2), the effect of media coverage for both saliency and tone are
positive. However, the effect is again much weaker in Germany com-
pared to Austria. This is most probably due to the fact that media
coverage data in Germany only covers highly salient coalitions, leaving
little substantive variance between outlets (see Fig. 2). Generally, in
such a stable media context, weaker effects should, in fact, be expected.
To interpret the size of the effects more directly we use plots.
Starting with Austria, Fig. 5 shows a linear effect of saliency and tone
on the perceptions of coalition preferences and likelihood, while
keeping all the other variables at their mean values. The plot on the left
of Fig. 5 indicates that while tone has a positive effect on coalition
preferences, the effect of saliency on coalition preferences is almost 0 as
indicated by the horizontal straight line. For likelihood, saliency and
tone have an almost equal effect, with the effect of saliency being even
larger than that of tone as showed by the steeper line in Fig. 5. Moving
to Germany and Fig. 6, the saliency and tone have no effect on coalition
preferences. Actually, it seems that tone has a negative effect on coa-
lition preferences though this is not statistically significant. Concerning
perceived likelihood, Fig. 6 indicates that both saliency and tone have
Fig. 2. Saliency of coalitions in news coverage.
Fig. 3. Tone toward coalitions in news coverage.
Fig. 4. Average preferences and expectations towards each coalition.
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the expected positive effect but the effect of tone is much larger and
significant.
Turning to our control variables; the larger the coalitions' standing
in the polls and the stronger the attentiveness to the campaign
(interaction in Table 1), the higher the perceived likelihood that the
coalition will form after the election, which confirms the findings in the
literature. Interestingly, the interaction has no effect on coalition pre-
ferences in Austria but is negative and significant in Germany, which
Table 1
The effect of media coverage on coalition preferences and expectations: linear regression models.
Germany Austria
Preferences Likelihood Preferences Likelihood
(M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5) (M6) (M7) (M8)
Media saliency 0.103 0.150 0.032 0.621***
(0.084) (0.081) (0.031) (0.033)
Media tone −0.036 0.101*** 0.079*** 0.194***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.017)
Coalition standing in the polls −0.002*** −0.002*** 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Campaign attention 0.042*** 0.039*** −0.042*** −0.042*** 0.014 0.014 −0.100*** −0.102***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.031) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027)
Standing× attention −0.001** −0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** −0.000 −0.000 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Party identification 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.207*** 0.206*** 0.032** 0.035***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Chancellor Preference 0.213*** 0.213*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.77*** 0.078*** −0.005 −0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
Education 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010** 0.010** 0.007 0.007 −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Political interest −0.011** −0.011** 0.014*** 0.014*** −0.016 −0.016 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Age −0.000 −0.000 −0.001** −0.001** −0.001* −0.001* −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gender −0.009 −0.009 0.004 0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.017 −0.016
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Incumbency dummy −0.133*** −0.141*** 0.084*** 0.045*** 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.473*** 0.404***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
Constant 0.404*** 0.408*** 0.284*** 0.300*** 0.230*** 0.228*** 0.371*** 0.210***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.050) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055)
N (observations) 9806 9806 9806 9806 5274 5274 5274 5274
N (individuals) 3113 3113 3113 3113 800 800 800 800
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.309 0.085 0.086 0.118 0.120 0.258 0.312
AIC 2486.6 2486.8 1616.8 1602.2 2553.9 2541.5 2065.2 1673.3
Notes: AIC = Akaike information criterion. To correct for each respondent being included several times in the data set, standard errors clustered by respondent are
computed. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Fig. 5. The effect of media coverage on coalition preferences and perceived likelihood (predictive margins with 95% CIs): Austria.
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suggests that the actual standing of the coalitions in interaction with the
attentiveness to this information has a very different effect on pre-
ferences than it does on likelihood. The incumbency effect is strong and
consistent across most models; in other words, regardless of any other
factors, the incumbent coalition is more liked and will be perceived as
more likely by voters (see Armstrong and Duch, 2010). The important
exception is the case of coalition preferences for Germany, where the
FDP – the minority partner in the incumbent coalition – had lost sup-
port among voters, thus tainting the effect of the incumbency bonus
(Faas, 2015). When it comes to political motivations, party identifica-
tion for one of the parties included in the coalition as well as preference
for the chancellor have consistently positive effects on preferences and
expectations (albeit the latter is not significant in Austria). This would
be in line with the discussed bandwagon effect. Beside this, age and
gender have no effect while political sophistication is positive in both
countries but only significant in Models 3 and 4 for Germany.
Survey data in Germany additionally allows for the inclusion of a
lagged dependent variable (measured at the beginning of the election
campaign). This ensures an even more conservative test of media ef-
fects. Importantly, by adding this lagged dependent variable, we obtain
identical results, thus confirming that our models were already well
specified for the task of measuring media effects on coalition pre-
ferences and expectations (see Appendix).
Overall, three main observations are noteworthy. First, our findings
suggest that media coverage of potential post-electoral coalition gov-
ernments during election campaigns has significant influence on citizen
expectations. The relatively large media effects we find compared to the
existing literature (e.g., Bennett and Iyengar, 2008) are most probably
related to the fact that coalitions are rather an abstract concept com-
pared to parties and candidates (Meffert and Gschwend, 2012), making
it even harder for citizens to escape the media's grasp. In this regard, we
see that media coverage has a larger impact on expectations than it does
on preferences, which confirms past research arguing coalition pre-
ferences to be most strongly influenced by long-term factors like party
affiliations, while expectations are more volatile and more likely to be
updated over the course of an election campaign. Second, there are
differences in terms of the effect of such media content being more
pronounced in contexts where media outlets generally tend to take
stronger stances toward politics (i.e., in Austria versus Germany). Third,
testing the effects of saliency and tone in one model disentangles the
effects of each and underlines the importance of considering several
dimensions of coverage when studying media effects during election
campaigns.
Given that media effects may be heterogeneous, we also test for
differences in media effect strength between groups of voters with low
and high education and partisans and non-partisans. The results in the
Appendix confirm the main findings of this paper. We also tested for a
combined measure of media saliency and tone. Such interaction, while
suggesting a multiplying effect of saliency on tone, has no substantive
effect on the conclusions presented in this paper.
7. Conclusions
In multiparty systems, coalition agreements usually determine the
orientation of governmental policy (Laver and Schofield, 1998). A
number of recent studies have shown that voters are aware of the po-
tential coalition alternatives when casting their ballot and coalition
preferences influence voting behaviour (Bargsted and Kedar, 2009;
Bowler et al., 2010). But, how do voters form their preferences and
perceptions about post-electoral coalition governments?
In this paper, we take on the task to investigate two sets of hy-
potheses related to media effects over post-electoral coalition govern-
ments. The first set of hypotheses relates to coalition preferences; the
findings show that saliency and positive tone of coalition coverage may
positively influence voters' preferences toward specific coalitions.
However, these effects could only be shown in Austria. In a second set
of models, we took a closer look at voters' perceived likelihood that a
certain coalition will form after the election. The empirical findings of
this section indicate that after controlling for structural differences
across outlets and coalitions as well as individual-level differences, we
indeed find evidence of media saliency and tone on said voter ex-
pectations. Here effects are much clearer in both countries. From our
models it is clear that media coverage has a larger impact on voter
expectations compared to preferences, the latter in fact appear to
mainly be driven by individual-level party predispositions.
Broadly speaking, results in Austria were stronger than in Germany.
This may be due to several reasons: 1) the German data was restricted
to only the three most salient coalitions, resulting in a very conservative
test; 2) the actual difference between outlets concerning coalition sal-
iency was very small, leaving little leeway for media effects; 3) effects
Fig. 6. The effect of media coverage on coalition preferences and perceived likelihood (predictive margins with 95% CIs): Germany.
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may be context dependent, since, in German newspaper parallelism is
weaker than in Austria (Lelkes, 2016). In sum, we expect the effect of
media coverage on voter expectations to be larger, the larger the dif-
ferences in coverage among different media sources.
There are several limitations with the present study on which future
research should leverage on. First, our study was constrained not only
by the quantity of survey questions and media data both countries'
election studies provide, but also by their comparability. While
Germany provided greater richness in media outlets, Austria provided
richness in the number of coalitions coded. In future studies, other
approaches in content coding may allow for more nuanced analyses of
media effects (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2007); for example more ex-
tensive and fine-grained data could allow researchers to investigate
party by party interactions in the media repertoire.
More broadly speaking, the prevalence of media saliency and tone
effects during the last few weeks of an election campaign has strong
implications for the role of media in democracy. While normative de-
mocratic theory demands citizens to be at least minimally informed, the
political information provided by the media is not the same across all
media outlets. As a result, the increase in media choice and fragmen-
tation may lead to a less equal distribution of political knowledge, as
well as to a polarization of the electorate concerning political pre-
ferences and expectations (e.g., Lelkes et al., 2015).
While our study does not deal with strategic voting in particular, our
findings inform such analyses, as we now have a clearer picture of how
media coverage may effect voter coalition expectations, which in turn
may influence their voting behaviour. When it comes to party strategies
during election campaigns and since voters seem to care about which
coalition governments will form after the election when casting their
vote (Faas et al., 2008; Meffert and Gschwend, 2011), parties can (and
should) emphasize and openly commit to certain coalition options if
they want to avoid misinformed voters or unfavourable media cov-
erage. This is less true for centrist parties which in general have lower
incentives in multiparty systems to commit to specific coalition gov-
ernments compared to non-centrist parties. In fact, committing to spe-
cific pre-electoral coalition on either the right or the left, may lead to
potential losses for centrist parties on the opposite side of the ideolo-
gical spectrum. In this regard, party elites might also consider the po-
sition and preferences of leading newspapers or journalists when de-
ciding about the next coalition government. In fact, if parties form a
coalition that is not preferred at all by the major newspapers, they are
likely to face critical media coverage, which could result in vote de-
clines in follow-up elections.
Future research should replicate these findings with data from
countries were contrary to Austria and Germany coalitions are a new
aspect of politics. At the same time, we hope election surveys will
collect better data about voters' expectations, including better measures
of cognitive decision strategies. This would also be important given that
the existing literature has shown that coalition preferences and ex-
pectations influence vote choice in general and strategic voting in
particular (Plescia, 2016). Similarly content data should enable one to
go beyond the generic measure of coalition coverage we have ex-
amined. For example, differentiating between statements from jour-
nalists', from parties belonging to the discussed post-electoral coalition
and rival parties attacking that potential coalition, will allow a more in-
depth examination of the individual-level mechanisms discussed in this
paper.
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